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Mitchell. The majority expressly sought only to "distinguish" Mitchell from
Fuentes, and if they intended to overrule Fuentes by implication, they may
have defeated their purpose. Courts all over the country have accepted the
Fuentes doctrine and policy. 4 One author stated, "Nineteen sixty-nine was
a momentous year. In that year the United States put a man on the moon,
and in that year the creditor met the constitution. 65 Since Fuentes was not
explicitly overruled, it is doubtful the lower courts will let the creditor forget
the constitution, unless a step backward is taken in the area of consumer
rights.
James I. Calk

TORTS-Products Liability-Strict Liability Is Imposed
Upon Supplier Of Chattel Under Lease
Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331
(Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
Plaintiff Adolph 0. Garza, a pipefitter, fell from scaffolding not equipped
with standard safety cleats. He sought recovery under the theory of strict
liability from J.E. Rourke Rental and Supplies, the lessor of the scaffolding.
The jury found that the absence of safety cleats rendered -the scaffolding
defective, that defendant Rourke could reasonably have anticipated that .the
scaffolding would be used without the addition of safety cleats, and that the
failure to have such devices was the producing cause of the fall. The trial
court entered judgment in Garza's favor. On appeal, Rourke contended that
there was no basis for liability because no negligence was found and that the
doctrine of strict liability is inapplicable to the renting and leasing of equiptional understandings that might justify . . . total disregard of stare decisis."

Mitchell

v. W.T. Grant Co., -

(1974).

U.S.

-,

-,

94 S. Ct. 1895, 1913, -

L. Ed. 2d

,

It was also stated that:
The only perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the
makeup of this Court.
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from
the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission

to serve.

Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1914, - L. Ed. 2d at-.
64. See, e.g., Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972); Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Hall v. Stone, 189 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1972).
65. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973).
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ment. Held-Affirmed. The doctrine of strict tort liability is applicable to

a lessor of a defective product.1
Strict liability in tort, or liability without fault, is a means of recovery
whereby the defendant can be held liable, even though he neither committed
moral wrongdoing, nor departed from a reasonable standard of care.2 The
early law of torts recognized "fault" or moral responsibility as the basis of
liability.3 That doctrine was gradually eroded, 4 and in 1960 Professor
Prosser introduced the theory of strict tort liability of a seller of defective
products to injured users or consumers. 5 In 1963 the California Supreme
Court first applied the doctrine to manufacturers, 6 and since that -time over
two-thirds of the states have adopted strict liability in products liability
actions against manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. 7 This judicial trend
was emphasized in 1965 when the American Law Institute included -the
theory as Section 402A in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a basis for
liability for sellers of defective and unreasonably dangerous products.8
With most states already holding sellers strictly liable, 9 it was logical for
courts to continue the expansion of the doctrine by extending strict liability
to the next level in the marketing enterprise. In 1965, in Cintrone v. Hertz
1. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
2. E.g., Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (containing
an elaborate citation and review of Texas and American authorities); Fresno Air Serv.
v. Wood, 43 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (1965).
3. E.g., Worthington v. Mencer, 11 So. 72 (Ala. 1892); Michigan City v. Rudolph,
12 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1938); Ault v. Hall, 164 N.E. 518 (Ohio 1928). See
generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 492-93 (4th ed. 1971).
4. E.g., Jaco v. Baker, 148 P.2d 938 (Ore. 1944). See generally W. PROssER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971).
5. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
6. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (plaintiff injured by defective combination power tool).
7. E.g., Helene Curtis Indus. Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); see Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1964). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 657-58
(4th ed. 1971).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and care of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
9. See Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 919-20 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing

authority from various jurisdictions).
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Truck Leasing & Rental Service,' 0 the New Jersey Supreme Court held, in
essence, that a commercial lessor should be subject to strict liability in tort
for injuries resulting from the lease of a defective product." Since then, California, Hawaii, Alaska, 'Illinois, and New Mexico have adopted the reasoning
of the New Jersey court and have expressly held that strict liability in tort
applies to the lessor of rental products as well as to the retail seller or manufacturer. 1 2 No distinction is generally made between the commercial lessor
and the retailer or manufacturer because each places products in the stream
of commerce knowing that they will be used without inspection for defects. 13
The increased utilization of leasing as an alternative to buying and as a
means of temporary convenience has made strict tort liability as relevant to
the lease as to the sales transaction.' 4 The risk of harm from a defective
product is present in both lease and sale transactions,' 5 and the lessee of the
product has an equal need as well as an equal right of protection from an
unreasonable risk of injury.' 6 The lessee relies on the expertise of the lessor

to provide a safe product just as a buyer so relies on a retailer.' 7 Finally,
the commercial lessor is in the best position to bear and distribute the loss
resulting from injury caused by a defective product' 8 in cases where he knows
and controls the conditions of -the product and can protect himself against
loss through insurance.' 9
Courts considering the issue, then, have disclosed an unwillingness to distinguish between sellers and nonsellers, such as commercial lessors, for pur-

10. 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965) (employee of the lessee of one of defendant's trucks
injured as a result of brake failure).
11. Id. at 778-79; accord, Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d 278, 285 (N.J.
1969).
12. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Fakhoury v. Magner, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1972); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Rental Equip. Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1969); Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car
Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (Ill.
1971); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972).
13. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970); accord, Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181 (1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Rental Equip. Co., 79
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. 1971); see Stewart
v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 479
P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972).
14. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970); see Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Fakhoury v. Magner, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Stewart v. Budget Renta-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178
(II. 1971); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965);
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972).
15. E.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970).
16. E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778 (N.J.
1965).
17. Id. at 778.
18. E.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 327 (Alaska 1970).
19. Id. at 328; see Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769,
778 (N.J. 1965).
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poses of strict liability. 20 The plaintiff lessee, nonetheless, must complete a
three-step burden of proof before imposing strict liability on a commercial lessor. If the plaintiff can establish: (1) that the lessor is engaged in the business of leasing, 21 (2) that he leased a defective product unreasonably danger22
ous to the user or consumer which caused injury to the user or consumer,
and (3) that the product leased was expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in its condition after lease, then strict liabil23
ity will be imposed on the lessor.
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co. 24 enunciated the now well-settled Texas rule that
a manufacturer who places a defective product in the stream of commerce
is strictly liable in tort to one who sustains injury because of its condition. 2
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.26 then asserted Texas' adoption of strict liability as embodied in Section 402A by holding that the absence of a sale does
not preclude the holding of the distributor of a defective product strictly liable
in tort. 27 Freitas v. Twin Cities Fisherman'sCooperative Association28 confirmed the rule that liability could arise under Sect-ion 402a where the transaction by which a product was placed in the stream of commerce was essen29
tially commercial in nature.
Rourke v. Garza3 0 was a case of first impression, as no prior Texas case
had expressly held that strict liability may be imposed on the supplier of a
chattel under a lease rather than a sale agreement.
Relying on Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Services ' and Bachner v. Pearson,3 2 the
court declared that
a product placed in the stream of commerce by a lease by one in the
business of leasing such products must be held to the same strict
20. E.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970).
21. Id. at 328.
22. Id. at 326; Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
23. Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844-45 (Ct.
App. 1966).
24. 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
25. Id. at 633.
26. 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (beauty shop operator held strictly liable
for plaintiff's burns and loss of hair caused by distributor's sample wave lotion).
27. Id. at 790-91; accord, Malinak v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 436 S.W.2d 210,
214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here
a truck driver sought recovery for personal injuries sustained in a fall from a platform
leading to the top of an oil tank from the oil company which owned the tank and a
boat service cooperative to whom the tank had been leased. After finding that neither
the oil company nor the boat service cooperative was in the business of selling or leasing
tanks, ladders, or platforms, the court ruled that the doctrine of strict liability was inapplicable.
29. Id. at 937-38.
30. 511 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
31. 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).
32. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
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liability in the case of a defective product unreasonably
dangerous
83
to the user as would be the seller of such a product.
Rourke has two significant aspects. First, the court adopted the premise
that there is no distinction among the commercial functions of the manufacturer, retailer, and commercial lessor. 34 Second, the court recognized a new
criterion for determining the applicability of strict liability.3 5 Although it was
previously considered essential to prove the technical existence of a sale of
an allegedly defective product,36 Rourke subordinated the technical necessity
of a sale to the priority of determining whether a supplier of goods placed
37
a defective product in the stream of commerce.
Rourke does follow the three-step requirement rule for establishing strict
liability in commercial leasing cases. First, although Rourke holds that strict
liability applies to lessors only if the lessors are regularly engaged in the leasing business,38 the court fails to define "engagement in the business of leasing," for the purposes of the doctrine. In determining what constitutes engagement in commercial leasing, other courts have looked to three main
factors: the commercial aspect of the transaction, that is, whether a fee is
paid, 9 the volume of the lessor's business, 40 and the relationship of the lease
,transaction to the sales function. 41 In the usual instance in which an established commercial leasing firm leases a product, generally a motor vehicle,
to a lessee for a short period of time, the doctrine has been uniformly applied.42 The doctrine has not been applied, however, where the lessor is not
33. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1974, no writ).
34. Id. at 336.
35. Id. at 336.
36. E.g., Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969); Freitas v. Twin Cities Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
37. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
38. Id. at 336.
39. See Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Gallucio
v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1971); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc.,
251 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d
769 (N.J. 1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972).
40. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968);
Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 234 A.2d 415, 418 (N.J. 1967) (holding that Cintrone only applies to the mass producer or mass lessor).
41. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968);
Freitas v. Twin Cities Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); accord, Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii
1970); Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 274 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. Ct. App. 1971); Ettin v. Ava Truck
Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 3, Art. 14

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. '6

a commercial business entity, even though ,the lease itself is commercial. 43
The cases do not specify the extent to which the defendant's leasing business
must be mass enterprise. Some decisions impose strict liability where the
lease activity is a normal activity incident to the primary sales function, although the defendant lessor is not primarily engaged in the leasing business. 44
Other decisions reject the contention that an isolated lease transaction constitutes engagement in the leasing business, even if the lease is an incident to
5
the sale.
Rourke and Freitas provide -the Texas definition of "engagement in the
business of leasing." Freitas forbade the application of strict liability because
the defendant's business did not entail the selling or leasing of -the allegedly
defective product and thus the rental of a ladder and platform was an isolated
lease transaction. 4 6 The lease of scaffolding in Rourke was a commercially
established procedure of a leasing company.4 7 These cases suggest, then,
that "engagement in the business of leasing" comprises a commercial lease
transaction within the usual course of the defendant's leasing business.
After first demonstrating that the defendant lessor is engaged in the busi*ness of leasing, the plaintiff must then prove that the lessor leased a defective
product. 48 Rourke defines a product as "defective" if the product exposes
its user to an unreasonable risk of harm when used for the purpose for which
it was intended. 49 ",Unreasonable risk of harm" means that
the article leased must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary user who leases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.5 0
Since Rourke holds that strict liability applies only to defects present when
the commercial lessor places the product in ,the stream of commerce, 5 a question arises as to the extent of the lessor's liability for defects in products leased
43. Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970) (city-owned and operated golf course
not strictly liable for injuries caused by lease of defective golf cart.
44. See, for example, Price v. Shell Oil Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 184-85 (1970).
45. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1968); W.E.
Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970); Conroy
v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 234 A.2d 415, 418 (N.J. 1967); Freitas v. Twin Cities Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Freitas v. Twin Cities Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931, 937
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 333, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
48. Id. at 336; see Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 317, 326 (Alaska 1970). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49. Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
50. Id. at 334.

51. Id. at 336.
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over a long period of time and subject to wear because of use. The lessor
who leases -the same article many times to different lessees should be held
liable for defects present each time the product leaves his hands. 52 On the
other hand, because in a sale the article leaves the hands of the manufacturer
or retailer only once, the difficulty of proving that the alleged defect existed
at that time increases with the passage of time and the frequency of use of
thearticle. 55 Under strict liability the commercial lessor, ,therefore, is held
to a higher degree of care than either the manufacturer or retailer.5 4 The New
Jersey court maintains that the greater burden imposed upon the commercial
lessor is both logical and defensible.5 5 Since the lessor's representation of
fitness for use is the same whether the product rented is new or used, the
law should not accept any distinction in the obligation assumed by the lessor. 56
In order to satisfy the -third and final requirement for imposing strict liability the plaintiff must prove that the leased product reached him without substantial change in its condition or use. 57 As in the case of a seller, the doctrine will not subject the commercial lessor to liability for a defect in
the-leased product where the leased product was altered or utilized in a way
not approved by the lessor. 58 Although not specifically mentioned in
Rourke, the imposition of strict liability on commercial lessors is further justified by the economic incentive to increase the safety of products. Strict liability will compel the commercial lessor to closely inspect the fitness for use
of rental products and reduce the economic benefits of leasing goods which
are approaching the end of their useful lives. 59 Any argument that the commercial'lessor 'may suffer a reduction in profits is negated by the concept of
"risk distribution." 60 'By implementing -this -theory, the commercial lessor can
compensate injuries resulting from a risk he has created by purchasing insurance and passing the costs along to the public in -the -formof higher rental
prices. 6'
52.

Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 777 (N.J. 1965).

53. The strict tort liability doctrine applies only to defects which were present when
the product was placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant seller or manufacturer.

See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963);

Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Sup. 1969).

54. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).

55. See id. at 777.
56. Id. at 777.

56. Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844-45 (Ct. App.

1966) (bale ejector leased from defendant altered by plaintiff's employer).
58. Id. at 844-45....

59. See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970). Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 777 (N.J. 1965).
60. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
61. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co.,
85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82 n.5 (1970) ; Cintrone' V. Hertz TrUckLeasing & Rental Serv.,
212 A.2d 769, 778 (N.J. 1965).
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The commercial lessor, then, "acts much like the retailer and manufacturer
in placing products in -the stream of commerce. ' 62 Also, the lessor is usually
in a better position than the user ,to prevent the circulation of defective products.0 3 Finally, the lessor, like a seller or manufacturer, is generally able
to allocate damages and insure against injuries caused by defective products
which he has placed in the stream of commerce. 4 For these reasons, the
doctrine of strict liability seems applicable to commercial lease transactions.
Rourke exemplifies Texas' acceptance of the strict tort liability doctrine
in a most comprehensive form. It also raises the question of whether the
,trend toward expanded, almost all-inclusive strict liability will continue. It
is now certain -that in Texas commercial lessors are subject to strict liability.
While there are no cases in which a commercial lessor has been held strictly
liable in tort for injuries to an "innocent bystander," it is conceivable that
a third person, most likely a pedestrian hit by a leased auto, will in the future
be able to recover from a commercial lessor.65 It is also conceivable that
licensors, who offer the public a privilege to use certain products, will be subject to the same strict liability as lessors. 66 It remains to be seen whether
Texas will extend liability for injuries resulting from defective products from
the manufacturer to other entities in the marketing enterprise such as -the
trademark licensor or the institutional lender who provides the necessary capital for the marketing effort.6 7 Rourke might well prove to be the outer limit
of the Texas theory. On the other hand, Rourke might well prove to be the
precursor for an expanded, all-inclusive strict tort liability doctrine.
Frank J. Cavico, Jr.
62. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 318, 328 (Alaska 1970).
63. Id. at 328.
64. Id. at 328.

65. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex. Sup. 1969) (dissenting
opinion) (third person recovery from the lessor can be based on the public policy to
afford maximum protection for the public safety and the concept of "risk distribution");
accord, Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1969).
All states adopting strict tort liability have extended recovery to bystanders when pre-

sented with the issue. See Caruth v. Mariana, 463 P.2d 83, 85 (Ariz. 1970).
66. Garcia v. Halsett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1970) (licensor of personal
property held subject to strict liability in tort for injury resulting from a defect in the
product). Although the licensor is not involved in the distribution of the product in
the same manner as a commercial lessor, the licensor does provide the product to the
public for use and plays more than a subsidiary role in the overall marketing enterprise
of the product.

Id. at 423.

67. Institutional lenders could become sufficiently engaged in writing "lease-finance" agreements to construe the transaction as more than an isolated aspect of their
business. The lender could thus be in the business of writing such agreements and functioning as an integral link in the marketing enterprise by which products flow into the
stream of commerce. Comment, Finance Lessor's Liability for Personal Injuries, 1 U.
ILL. L.F. 154 (1974).
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